EXPLAINING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF COMPLEXITY IN ANTI-CORRUPTION WORK

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Abstract: What explains the rapid expansion of programmes undertaken by donor agencies which may be labelled as 'anti-corruption programmes' in the 1990s? There are four schools of anti-corruption project practice: universalistic, state-centric, society-centric, and critical schools of practice. Yet, none can explain the expansion of anti-corruption projects. A 'complexity perspective' offers a new framework for looking at such growth. Such a complexity perspective addresses how project managers, by strategically interacting, can create emergent and evolutionary expansionary self-organisation. Throughout the 'first wave' of anti-corruption activity in the 1990s, such self-organization was largely due to World Bank sponsored national anti-corruption programmes. More broadly, the experience of the first wave of anti-corruption practice sheds light on development theory and practice—helping to explain new development practice with its stress on multi-layeredness, participation, and indigenous knowledge. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Programmes undertaken by donor agencies which may be labelled as 'anti-corruption programmes' have expanded significantly in the 1990s. Part of this expansion has been due to the growing recognition that corruption is deleterious to economic and institutional development (World Bank, 2000). Another part of the expansion of the anti-corruption 'industry' has been due to greater donor and government willingness to address corruption related issues (Hors and Tamesis, 1999).[1] A key feature of the anti-corruption industry is

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[1]The anti-corruption 'industry' refers to the complete group of anti-corruption projects undertaken by public and private organizations working on anti-corruption.

the wide variety of programmes conducted in a large number of countries. Anti-corruption programmes have been targeted at government officials, parliamentarians, journalists, business people, 'youth', NGOs, and international organization representatives in over 40 countries. What lessons can be gleaned from this 'first wave' of anti-corruption work in the 1990s for anti-corruption project managers working in the 2000s, and more broadly for theory and practice in the field of international development?

This paper will argue that a 'complexity perspective' of anti-corruption projects represents a new way of theorizing and practising international development. Section I will provide a review of the four schools of anti-corruption practice. Section II will review ideas from complexity theory which can help shed light on the emergence and growth of the anti-corruption industry. The review is aimed at readers completely unfamiliar with complexity theory.[2] Section III will provide a general overview of the donor-sponsored anti-corruption industry—focusing mostly on World Bank projects—and explain how the global-scale donor supported anti-corruption industry evolved from a relatively simple set of World Bank project implementation practices. The final section will attempt to place a complexity view of anti-corruption in the broader development literature, showing how the understanding of anti-corruption project management from a complexity perspective offers new perspectives for the theory and practice of international development.

THE NEED FOR NEW THEORIES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION

While there has been much written on general theories of corruption, relatively little has been written on the theoretical underpinnings of the practice of fighting corruption. Theories of corruption address the role of the economy (Campos *et al.*, 1999; Mauro, 1995), the state (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Holmes, 2000; Riley, 1993; Jomo and Khan,

Table 1.   Summary of anti-corruption programme foundations

	Universalistic	Static-centre	Society-centric	Critical
Who	'Society'	State	Civil society	Power institutions
What	Mechanistic programmes	Government reform	Social reproduction	Epistemic contestation
Where	In all 'stakeholder groups'	State	Outside of the state	In discursive practices
Why	Social rules dictate change	State 'machine' is broken	People know what is best	Hegemony
How	Technocratic programmes	Public sector reform	Participation	Semiotic control
Main areas	Integrity systems	Civil service reform, budget reform, administrative reform	Media, schools, NGOs, cultural institutions	International organisations and governments
Author examples	Pope (2003); Klittgaard *et al.* (1994)	Pynes (1997); Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi (1999); Schick (1998)	Burnham (1976); Vogl (1998); Cassange (2002); Jenkins and Goetz (1999)	Polzer, T (2001)

Source: author.

[2]'Complexity theory' represents a multi-disciplinary science comprising a number of theories which comprise the science as a whole.

2000) and society (Gupta, 1995; Pavarala, 1996; Ledeneva, 1998).[3] However, the practitioner writing has not been motivated by a wider *explicit* theoretical view of how corruption is generated and fought.[4]

While the practitioner literature has not explicitly addressed theory, practitioner approaches *implicitly* adopt four theoretical approaches. These theories fall into universalistic, state-centric, society-centric and critical schools of practice. Universalistic approaches to anti-corruption view corrupt transactions between state and non-state actors as a universal phenomenon occurring in organisations which run according to well-defined social laws. Given the existence of such social laws, anti-corruption programmes are universally applicable and replicable. State-centric anti-corruption practice stresses the role of state actors (civil servants in the executive, parliament, judiciary, and quasi-public agencies) in generating and propagating corruption. Unlike universalistic theories, state-centred theories allow for the role of personalities and power struggles. Society-centric approaches to anti-corruption focus on non-state actors in corrupt transactions. While the role of personalities and power struggles is discussed, like state-centric theories, more harmonious views of the role of 'civil society' is the centre of attention. Critical approaches note that there is nothing intrinsic about state and non-state actor relations which cause corruption. Taking their lead from much of the post-modern literature, they stress the 'socially constructed' nature of corruption and argue that the anti-corruption practitioner can do more to foment corruption than to fight it.

Universalistic approaches to anti-corruption tend to focus on legal and society-level project design and implementation. Given the implicit existence of social laws, these approaches may change over time as society evolves—but they tend to stress the similarities of anti-corruption across countries. Legal approaches implicitly assume the implementation powers attendant with the passage of regulations and laws prohibiting bribery and corruption (Piragoff, 2000; Biallas, 1998). Practical approaches based on this perspective include the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and treaties and conventions of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organisation of American States (OAS) and World Customs Organization (WCO).[5]

General toolkits and diagnostic instruments are also based on a universalistic conception of anti-corruption. Pope (2003) represents a useful, but classical conception of universalistic anti-corruption. Adopting a particularly functionalist approach to society, the Sourcebook argues for the establishment of 'national integrity systems' which integrate various groups in society together like organs in a body. The Sourcebook offers advice on building political will, changes to parliament, executive, judiciary, supreme audit institutions, ombudsman's office, independent anti-corruption agencies, local government, media, civil society, private sector, international actors and mechanisms, election processes, administrative law, public service ethics, financial management systems, competition policy, laws, as well as offers advice on using surveys to track perceptions of corruption. Klitgaard *et al.* (2000) represents a toolkit which describes three stages of anti-corruption work: diagnosis, strategy, and implementation. A separate

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[3]Citations are merely indicative as the body of theorising about corruption ranges across thousands of writers. For more, see on-line bibliographies at http://people.colgate.edu/mjohnston/default.htm, http://www.fsa.ulaval.ca/personnel/vernag/EH/F/ethique/corrupt.biblio.html, or http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/Corruption/index.htm [Accessed 8 April 2004].
[4]For the purposes of this paper, corruption is defined as the 'use of public power for private gain' (World Bank, 1997).
[5]See http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/nocorruptionweb/Law/treaties.htm for these texts.

chapter deals with corruption 'as a system'—heralding back to the structural-functionalist writings of authors like Talcott Parsons.[6] Such approaches have been adopted by the World Bank and USAID among others.[7]

The state-centric approach to anti-corruption views state actors as the instigators of corruption and thus the centre of anti-corruption activity. While maintaining its belief in social laws—like the universalistic theories—the state centric approach makes allowance for human actors and state specificities. State-centric theories allow for a wider range of effects ranging from political to sociological causes of corruption. Drawing upon the public sector management literature, fighting corruption relies on the reform of economic policy, public expenditure/financial management, administrative/civil service reform, legal and judicial systems, and public oversight mechanisms. Moreover, unlike universalistic approaches which stress direct action against corruption, the focus of state-centric programmes is not directed at reducing corruption directly. Instead, they aim at increasing accountability and transparency in public sector processes and services—ultimately with the aim of reducing political patronage. Corruption is the means by which economic opportunity is transformed into political power.

Civil service reform includes projects aimed at the establishment of meritocratic systems for appointment, promotion, and performance evaluation, creation or strengthening of independent civil service oversight bodies, and increasing salaries (Pynes, 1997). Fiscal management reform projects include reducing off-budget accounts and contingent liabilities, budget formulation reform, and treasury system reform (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi, 1999; Schick, 1998). Projects aimed at external and internal audit are also important elements in the reform (Henley *et al.*, 1992). Finally, to reduce civil servant discretion over administrative decisions, there are programmes aimed at simplifying administration and bureaucratic procedures. Unlike universalistic theories, these projects often seek to address human resource management issues related to propensity to engage in corruption such as drivers of motivation, social influences, and less frequently politics.

Society-centric approaches to anti-corruption—denying an intrinsic or existential form of corruption—tend to see corruption as socially constructed and reproduced. In other words, corruption does not simply exist, but is interpreted, created and recreated in the meanings given to it by social and cultural institutions. The society-centric school sees corruption as the result of social forces either for or against corruption—and particularly stresses the role of 'civil society' and NGOs in the fight against corruption. Projects focused on the media stress the role of newspapers, radio and television as an 'agency of social reproduction'. In school systems, a number of projects aim at teaching grade school children about anti-corruption in countries like Argentina's *Classrooms without Borders*, Bangladesh's *Mobile Theatre Programme*, and Kenya's anti-corruption essay contest among others.[8] Anti-corruption programmes conducted by NGOs are either aimed at their

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[6]I will not provide a critique of the universalistic approach to anti-corruption other than to note its neglect of the politics of reform, history of reform, as well as its commitment of the 'functionalist fallacy'. For other critiques, including arguments that the universalistic approach ignores more modern conceptions within its approach, see Michael (2003).

[7]For an example of a World Bank toolkit, see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/lac_core/00intro-eng.pdf. For USAID, see http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/acmodule/index.html. Particularly interesting is the World Bank Institute's 'Step-by-Step Guide to the Implementation of the New Empirical Tools for Anti-Corruption and Institutional Reform' (which includes country reports on Cambodia, Albania, Slovakia and Latvia)—see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/diagnostics.html#guide. See Bailey (2000) for an example from CIDA [Accessed 10 April 2004].

[8]For more information, see: http://admin.corisweb.org/files/AntiC_Edu_Activities_TI_NCs_April031053 502498.doc

membership or externally in other parts of 'civil society' (see Cassange, 2002 or Jenkins and Goetz, 1999 for examples).

The fourth school—the critical school—argues that no anti-corruption programme is the best anti-corruption programme. In this view, anti-corruption programmes serve the interests of the actors who advocate such programmes—usually international organizations and national governments (but increasingly NGOs who obtain funds from these two organizations). The language of anti-corruption serves to 'depoliticize'—or draw attention away from the political contestation attendant with the design of anti-corruption programmes and with the transfer of money and power attendant with anti-corruption programme implementation (Polzer, 2001). Given that all anti-corruption activity aims at increased control, regulation or scrutiny over state actors and non-state actors (or both), anti-corruption programmes inherently extend state power and thus 'governmentality'. Softer versions of the critical school—which does not consist a school of practice in itself but a rather a rejection of the other schools of practice—focus on 'unintended consequences' such as reducing state capacity (Anechiarico and Jacobs, 1996) or anti-corruption used as a tool to try to increase government legitimacy (Holmes, 1993). Anti-corruption, particularly as practiced by the World Bank, has been tied to a 'post-Washington consensus' which focuses on using the broader governance agenda to maintain the power of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Lindsey and Dick, 2002).

However, all four approaches avoid a systemic approach to anti-corruption. Systems can not be understood through simple cause-and-effect relationships. All the schools of practice mentioned above argue that a certain set of causes leads to a certain set of results. In universalistic theories, better 'functional fit' between 'stakeholders' produces less corruption. In state-centric and society-centric schools of practice, 'fixing' state or social mechanisms reduces corruption. In the critical approach, anti-corruption helps propagate the notion and practice of corruption. The theoretical consequence of such approaches is to use linear regression analysis—with corruption as the independent variable—and look at its effects on investment (Wei, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997), on government behaviour (Mauro, 1998), economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1996), or social indicators (Kaufmann, 2003).[9] Yet, corruption (just like anti-corruption) does not exist in such simple relationships—but exists as systems and so a systems approach must be taken.

From a theoretical point of view, corruption has been 'compartimentalized' being treated relatively differently by anthropologists (Gupta, 1995), sociologists (Ledevena, 1998), economists (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), political scientists (Jomo and Khan, 2000) and development practitioners. However, corruption is a 'multi-disciplinary' phenomenon—it impacts as much on society as much as on the public administration—requiring a systems approach. Such a systems approach can also explain how current anti-corruption programmes were developed and propagated—thus allowing for a better understanding for changes needed to the global anti-corruption industry (Michael, 2004).

A NON-RIGOROUS REVIEW OF COMPLEXITY CONCEPTS

A systemic approach should be taken toward anti-corruption work. A branch of study known as 'complexity theory'—more rigorously the study of complex adaptive

[9]While the critical school would seemingly be averse to using linear regression analysis, its hypotheses could be tested by correlating anti-corruption work with measures of organizational power.

systems—is increasingly offering the tools required to see complex and system-wide linkages.[10] In the pages that follow, I will review the role of spontaneous self-organisation, the 'emergence' of systemic properties in these self-organized systems, and feedback in the system which causes the system to adjust.

The basic idea behind complexity theory is that individual 'agents' (whether they are people or organizations) engage in strategic behaviour which contributes to the formation of a system. Such systems are often called 'adaptive' systems because some agents must change their behaviour to adapt to other agents. A classic example of such interaction occurs on the roads. If other agents drive on the left side of the road, then the 'incentives' are to also drive on the left side of the road and visa versa (Weibull, 1997). There are a range of examples of such strategic interaction producing different 'order' depending on the incentives agents are given to co-operate or compete (Axelrod, 1997).[11] Unlike the 'covering law' type theories of social interaction favoured by the positivists in the 19th century (and still favored by anti-corruption practitioners in the 21st century), agent-based approaches show how order emerges from individual interaction.[12]

While many game theory examples focus on simple interaction between two agents using a simple range of strategic options (in order to be easily understood), advances in computer simulation allow for more sophisticated analyses. Such simulation allows for 'multi-agent' systems where the agents need not be homogeneous—as is required for mathematical tractability in the social sciences. Figure 1 shows an example of such an agent-based simulation using the Swarm software package. In the 'heatbug' world, each 'agent' generates heat, which diffuses over space. Each agent also has a certain ideal temperature it would like to achieve and can only achieve this heat by being close to other heatbugs. Such behaviour leads to clustering as shown in the figure because the agglomeration of agents generates sufficient heat which is 'swarmed to'. Feedback inherently exists in the system because if the agents are too cold, they will increase their congregation over time.

However, Figure 1 can have a number of different interpretations. If each agent represents an anti-corruption project manager generating some result—be it reductions in corruption or positive PR which attracts other agents—then such a simple model can be used to help describe the evolution of the anti-corruption industry. As can be seen in Figure 2, anti-corruption programmes geographically across the world also demonstrate clustering behaviour. The four large global donor-sponsored clusters are in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. Without knowing anything about the levels of corruption in these countries or the workings of anti-corruption programmes, it is possible to model the spread of the anti-corruption industry based on the simple 'heatbug' rule—congregate with others until the agents reach their desired 'temperature' (or status). Such clustering is 'emergent' behaviour because clustering is not planned or directed—but arises out of the accumulation of stable strategic behaviour.[13]

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[10]The following section reviews of some of the salient ideas from complexity and is aimed at the reader completely unfamiliar with complexity theory. These readers may wish to see Bak (1996), Holland (1995, 1998), Kauffman (1995) and Kelly and Allison (1999) for a beginner's introduction to the subject. As mentioned previously, I refer to 'complexity theory' as this has become the moniker of the study of complexity and aspects such as complex adaptive systems.

[11]There are a number of incentive structures which generate a wide range of 'games' such as the Stag-Hunt, Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk-Dove game, Chicken and others. I will not review these games other than to note that simple strategies can generate 'equilibria' or broader patterns for agent-based social interaction.

[12]For applications to the social and organizational sciences, see Epstein and Axtell (1996) and Arthur *et al.* (1997).

[13]Readers interested in conducting their own simulations should consult Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999).

Figure 1. The Heatbug World. (from Swarm Webpage)

Figure 2. The Heatbug World of anti-corruption. (*Source:* Author)

The above analysis assumes that the distribution of corruption geographically does not necessarily influence the position of anti-corruption programmes. If the 'landscape' under which agents operate is important, then such clustering may exhibit different characteristics. Figure 3 shows a 'sugarscape' model. In its original formulation, sugar is distributed and sugar-loving bugs (they could even be heat bugs) are distributed randomly across the 'sugarscape'—as shown in Figure 3(a). As the agents search out the sugar they crave, they form clusters around sugar—as shown in Figure 4(b).[14] If the sugar in this model is interpreted as the distribution of corruption and the agents as anti-corruption project managers, then again it is possible to model a wide-range of behaviours over time for the anti-corruption industry.[15]

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[14]In slightly more rigorous language, a complex adaptive system arises with emergent properties as agents learn and adapt to their environment.

[15]See the entire movie at: http://www.brook.edu/es/dynamics/sugarscape/movies.htm. Using agent-based simulations, one can explain the rise of micro-societies (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) and even complex social patterns such as racism (Schelling, 1969).

Figure 3.   (a) Initial distribution in the sugarscape. (b) subsequent distribution in the sugarscape. (*Source*: Brookings Institute. Available at: http://www.brookings.org/dybdocroot/sugarscape/movies.htm) [Accessed 18 March 2004]

Figure 4 shows a rough international correlation between corruption and civil society activity. The bars on the left hand side show the proportion of countries with a certain Transparency International Transparency Index ranking range. Countries rating in the 9 area have the highest transparency and those rating 1 have the lowest. The bars on the right-hand side show the proportion of countries with civil society involvement within a certain range.[16] As these data show, a sugarscape view of anti-corruption work may provide an interesting perspective on the international growth of anti-corruption work.[17] If the 'sugar' in this case is the corruption, and the sugar-loving (or sugar-hating) bugs are civil society organizations, than one can see some correlation—albeit weak—between the source of civil society attraction (or repulsion depending on beliefs about civil society response to corruption) and corruption. Such clustering can be called 'self-organization'


Figure 4.   Transparency in an international perspective. (*Source*: Michael (2004b))

[16]Data for transparency are taken from Transparency International at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2002/2002.08.28.cpi.en.html [Accessed 18 March 2004]. Data for the civil society index are taken from Anheier and Stares (2002). The civil society index has been rescaled to match the transparency index. More information can be found in Michael (2004b).

[17]The Transparency International index has methodological problems as a 'survey of surveys' as does the civil society index as for the same reason. These data are used only as 'ball-park figures'.

Figure 5.   Distribution of anti-corruption projects in Africa

because there is no central authority indicating where anti-corruption activity is to be conducted. Instead, strategic interaction creates organizational pattern for the anti-corruption industry.

   Self-organization can change over time.[18] Such dynamic self-organization is illustrated by the example of simulated birds known as 'boids' (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). These boids form flocks based on four rules related to 'separation' to avoid other boids, 'alignment' requiring the boid to steer towards the average heading of local flockmates, 'cohesion' requiring the boid to steer toward the average position of the other boids and 'collision avoidance' to prevent boids from running into objects on the landscape. Rather than 'planning' a flock formation or pattern, instructing each boid with these simple rules generates complex flocking behaviour which looks like real birds and insects. Again, such flock-with-no colliding rules can generate results which look similar to the anti-corruption industry. Figure 5 shows the 'scramble for Africa' between international donors working on anti-corruption in Africa. Just like on the global scale, flocking behaviour occurs. However, if donors work in the same country, they often avoiding doing so in the same year. Without knowing anything about the strategic considerations of the international donors, it is possible to model the distribution of anti-corruption programmes—bringing into question whether donors follow strategic considerations or simple rules of thumb like boids!

   In general, these models, like the anti-corruption industry examples given, display growth and preferential attachment. For systems displaying growth and preferential attachment, their organizational structure can be described using a 'power law' (Barbási, 2002). Most social relationships are governed by a normal distribution—with the standard

[18]In the literature, 'self-organization' refers to systemic properties exhibited by agents in a multi-agent system as they respond to feedback with regard to reactions of the moves of other agents. Given the need to both cover core concepts from complexity theory and to apply them in a short paper, I sacrifice some rigor in defining terms and leave the reader to explore these issues further in the previously given readings.

Figure 6.   Example of a power law. (*Source*: Michael (2004c))

bell curve appearance. For example, the number of international, national or local anti-corruption programmes should have a well-defined average with a deviation around that average. However, for power law relationships, there is no average. As shown in Figure 6, on the *y*-axis is the size of the anti-corruption programme and on the *x*-axis is the number of anti-corruption programmes. Such power laws appear frequently. Zipf's Law is an example of such a power law—noting the relationship in city size where a couple of cities are very large and the vast majority are quite small. Income distribution is another example of a power law where a few people have a great deal of wealth and most have a small amount. Similarly, in the anti-corruption industry, there are a couple of large programmes every year such as the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) which occur only once a year, national conferences which are conducted globally between 10–20 times and local level events which are organised globally hundreds of times a year.[19]

   If the rules of agent interaction are more complex, a modelled system can resemble more accurately the evolutionary nature of anti-corruption. Such rules are often derived from rules in the natural sciences based on variation, selection and retention (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000; Nelson and Winters, 1982). Variation rules refer to the method by which agents can change. In nature, variation occurs through genetic change. In the evolution of the anti-corruption industry, variation may be programme modifications undertaken by project managers focusing on different groups of 'stakeholders', programme sequencing, or components. Interaction refers to rules determining which genetic material (or which programme components) combine or are eliminated. In an anti-corruption context, such interaction can occur in organizations (with routines or meeting schedules determining the nature of this interaction) as well as 'on the ground' in programme implementation. Retention refers to the agent's ability to survive in the Darwinian struggle of 'survival of the fittest.'[20] In an anti-corruption context, successful or prominent project managers work to ensure the retention of their projects and the ideas upon which those projects are based.[21] Evolution is necessarily path-dependent, depending on the 'technological paradigm' or 'technological regime' (Dosi, 1988). The recombination of ideas may provide the

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[19]For power law relationships, the same relationships hold irregardless of the scale on which the observer looks. Such relationships are said to be 'self-similar' or 'fractal' and one way of determining if a relationship exhibits such fractal nature is to plot it on a log-log graph. I will not go into details here other than to note that the anti-corruption industry appears to follow the same relations nationally as globally.
[20]The stability of such systems over time can be represented by its 'fitness landscape'. The fitness landscape shows the relative performance for various degrees of coupling and for a certain number of agents. Given these two parameters, some choices are better than others.
[21]Such an evolutionary approach has been widely used in the industrial literature (Nooteboom, 2000).

Figure 7. The anti-corruption ecosystem

variation, selection and retention needed for industry growth (Weitzman, 1998). If anti-corruption project managers contribute to such recombinant growth—following a simple rule such as 'take a prior set of knowledge combine it with local country circumstances, and then move on to the next project—then the richness of the present anti-corruption industry can be explained.

Such evolutionary models of industry development help explain the emergence of organizational patterns which are more complex that clustering. Eco-systems may arise as agents adapt, yet must co-operate or compete with other agents which have adapted differently or not at all. Such industrial eco-systems have been described as population ecologies—where enterprise variation leads to some enterprises becoming suppliers, others pursuing niching strategies, and some growing. In the anti-corruption context, the organizational eco-system is shown by figure 7 which shows the linkages between different stakeholders.

The main sets of actors in Figure 7 are donors, governments, contractors, universities and research institutes, and NGOs. The figure does not differentiate international level organizations from local ones.[22] Links between donors and governments are usually uni-directional, as donors give both anti-corruption ideas and funding. Contractors usually include consulting firms—for example Collaboration for Development Action (CDA) helped perform an OECD anti-corruption evaluation as part of its Donor Standards in Anti-Corruption Project (DSACP).[23] World Vision engages in anti-corruption projects as does Management Systems International and Casals & Associates (both in Washington). Yet, the majority of expertise hired by international donors comes from the academic or 'third sector'. Local academic or think-tank partners are often used for programmes in developing countries. Experts from well-known Western universities also serve as resource persons for anti-corruption projects. These resource persons often straddle the NGO-university line—belonging to the nebulous third sector.

[22]While not shown in the figure, the donors have a high degree of linkage among themselves—more than linkages between governments, or any other group's inter-linkages.
[23]As is often the case in anti-corruption, reports put on the Internet are often removed. During the course of research for this paper, several national anti-corruption plans and World Bank work were taken off to Internet and are no longer available. See author for a copy of the report downloaded from the Internet.

Such an approach to explaining the rise of the anti-corruption industry is very different than the theories reviewed in the last section. Universalistic theories would stress the role of integrated systems in fighting corruption. State-centric and society-centric theories would look at the underlying causes of corruption and explain anti-corruption programmes based on that corruption. Critical theories would look at the international organization and national government politics and incentives for gaining power and 'deconstruct the anti-corruption discourse'. The evolutionary approach just explained explains the rise of anti-corruption as a self-organized system—stressing the 'learning by doing' nature of anti-corruption activity.[24]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INDUSTRY

The 'first wave' of anti-corruption effort started roughly in the mid-1990s with World Bank programmes in East Africa (Marquette, 1997). As noted by the World Bank (2003) 'since 1996, the World Bank has supported more than 600 anticorruption programs and governance initiatives developed by its member countries'.[25] The first World Bank programmes were run in Uganda and Tanzania where national integrity workshops attempted to bring together all stakeholders to devise a 'national integrity action plan'.[26] Africa focused training has also been undertaken by the Bank's Anti-Corruption Core Course piloted in Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda. The similarity of these programmes can be seen by the Durban African country summaries.[27] Given that these programmes were run by the same organization and often the same individuals, it is highly probable that they were operating according to the evolutionary rule referred to earlier—learn something, add to what you already know, apply and then go to next project. Even the high degree of similarity in the evaluations of country programmes suggests such rule following for Tanzania,[28] Malawi,[29] and Ethopia.[30] Such rule following suggests the formation of a complex adaptive system with feedback being obtained from each country project.

Based on a number of sources compiled by Heather Marquette and the World Bank, Figure 8 shows roughly the propagation of World Bank anti-corruption projects in the 1990s. In the early to mid-1990s, the experience of Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) played a large role in suggesting 'best practice' for other country programmes based on ideas becoming popular in the development literature such as 'participation'. These ideas, along with ideas from the developed countries and methodologies devised at the World Bank were first piloted in East Africa. Many of these experiences served as reference cases for future work conducted by the Bank in Bolivia, Nicaragua and Venezuela just 2–3 years later. By the mid to late 1990s, Eastern Europe

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[24]The anti-corruption industry could be a complex adaptive system responding to another complex adaptive system—namely corruption. However, corruption data are difficult to obtain and a discussion of the complex organization of corrupt transactions lies outside the scope of this paper.

[25]http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/

[26]See van Gils *et al.* (1998) for an evaluation of these programmes and see Marra (1999) for a more general evaluation. See Huther and Shah. (2000) for a broader evaluation methodology.

[27]Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/durban_pdfs/durban1.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2003].

[28]http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/TanzaniaGCA.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2003].

[29]http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/MalawiGCA.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2003].

[30]http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/EthiopiaGCA.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2003].

Figure 8.   Propagation mechanism: toward evolution? (*Source*: Michael (2004a))

was 'opening up' in that the first waves of privatisation had been finished and problems with corporate governance and state reform were signalling large-scale problems with corruption. As corruption became an increasingly charged political topic, World Bank programmes started appearing in Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, Latvia and later Russian Federation. Many of these programmes were barely 2–3 years old when the 1997 economic crises occurred in East Asia. The result was increased Bank (and International Monetary Fund) attention to transparency in East Asia. Such a spread of experience was fortunate as cases from Africa and Latin America would probably have been less well received than cases from Eastern Europe.[31] Not to be outdone by the 'cutting edge' work of the World Bank, the OECD and the Asian Development Bank teamed up to start the ADB-OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia Pacific.[32] For more information on individual countries, see Table 2 which lists websites of anti-corruption information 'consolidators'.

Often World Bank anti-corruption work was carried out either in collaboration with USAID and UNDP or directly by these agencies. The USAID Latin American bureau co-sponsored a regional workshop in Argentina in September 1998; the Europe and Eurasia bureau co-sponsored a regional workshop in Turkey in October 1998; and the Asia bureau co-sponsored a regional workshop in the Philippines in July 1999. In addition, the Office

Table 2.   Anti-corruption information 'Consolidators'

Africa	Not known
Middle East/Maghreb	Not known
Asia	http://www1.oecd.org/daf/Asiacom/countries/index.htm [Accessed 10 April 2004]
Latin America	http://www.respondanet.com/english/
Eastern Europe	www.nobribes.org http://www1.oecd.org/daf/SPAIcom/sitemap.htm

[31]By 1999, the World Bank (1999) reported having activities in Albania, Benin, Bolivia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Indonesia, Latvia, Mali, Tanzania, and Uganda.
[32]See http://wwwl.oecd.org/daf/ASIAcom/ for more information. Recent initiatives in Southeast Europe are not shown due to their newness. The bombing of Belgrade in 1999 created an important 'market' for anti-corruption across the Balkans which a number of donors and especially the OECD have competed for vigorously.

of Democracy and Governance, the Office of Economic Growth, and the Europe and Eurasia bureau co-sponsored an international conference on the role of the private sector in fighting corruption in Washington DC in February 1999. USAID in Nicaragua, and USAID in Guatemala have also collaborated with the World Bank on a Central America Regional Integrity Workshop held in September 1998. USAID has also worked with the World Bank on anti-corruption workshops and programs in Georgia and Albania and through the State Department's Coordinator's Office to coordinate anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine and Russia. As for UNDP, it has sponsored five regional workshops for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the Arab States, Central/Eastern Europe and the CIS, and Latin America and the Caribbean, and provided support for the International Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban (South Africa) in 1999.

Support for much anti-corruption work comprised assistance with the creation of anti-corruption action plans. These action plans were lists of actions which representatives (usually from the country or countries concerned) agreed in a meeting to undertake. These representatives are often listed in the action plan under the organization (or 'stakeholder group') which they belong to—such as the executive, judiciary, parliament, media, church, NGO sector, private sector or the international community. An example of such an action plan is shown in Table 3 which lists Coalition 2000's (from Bulgaria) anti-corruption programme covering public sector reform, legal reform, economic reform, civil society actions, and international co-operation.

The anti-corruption industry displayed the evolutionary traits of variation, selection and retention. Variation in action plans across countries was sometimes small and at other times large (Haarhuis and Leeuw, 2000). Haarhuis and Torenvlied (2000) find that such variation was attributable to bargaining power—ignoring the role of international donor project design. Figure 9 shows the variety of programmes undertaken by the donors and the relative distribution of anti-corruption projects—and anti-corruption knowledge (Michael, 2004). UNDP appears to favour programmes which could be deemed as 'capacity building', the Department of Economic and Social Affairs also has a large number of 'capacity building' programmes yet has a greater relative share of 'law enforcement' activities than UNDP. The Center for International Crime Prevention has roughly an equal weighting of 'capacity building' and 'awareness raising' programmes. OECD appears to have 'awareness raising' supporting the Anti-Bribery Convention while it's Co-operation with Non-Members appears to focus greatly on 'capacity building.' Council of Europe and Transparency International are noted for the large number of reported activities which appear to balance 'capacity building', 'awareness raising' and 'law enforcement'.[33] Of the approaches taken by these donors, Marquette (2001) notes that they stress the role of accountability, civil society, decentralisation, democracy (except World Bank), human rights, legal reform (except UNDP), media (except UNDP), NGOs, partnership building, private sector, privatisation (except UNDP), public sector, service delivery, transparency and watchdogs.

Selection occurred largely through the politics and internal discussion within the Bank on the best forms of anti-corruption. The Bank's 1998 report *Helping Countries Combat Corruption* represented one of the first 'consensus positions' of the Bank's various project managers and departments—which before had produced a stream of separate publications produced by individual departments. By 2000, World Bank project managers were

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[33]Conspicuously absent are USAID and the World Bank. Marquette (2001b) argues against any specialization based on comparative advantage.

Table 3. Bulgaria anti-corruption action plan

First Action Line: Creating a Favorable Institutional and Legal Environment for Curbing Corruption
1. Public Administration Reform
2. Establishing New Institutions and Offices with Controlling and Monitoring Functions, and Improving Existing Ones
3. Developing the Public Procurement System
4. Reform of The Political Party Sphere

Second Action Line: Reforming the Judicial System
1. Legislative Reform
2. Reorganizing the Operation Of The Judicial System
3. Improving Staff Recruitment Procedures and Professional Training
4. Taking Measures to Expose Corruption in the Judicial System

Third Action Line: Curbing Corruption in the Economy
1. Transparency and Accountability in the Privatization Process
2. Liberalizing the Conditions for Private Business Development
3. Limiting Corruption in Financial and Economic Relations within the Private Sector
4. Enhancing the Effectiveness of Economic Arbitration Procedures

Fourth Action Line: Enhancing Civic Control in the Fight Against Corruption
1. Developing the Institutional Framework of Civic Control
2. Involving Professional Associations and Trade Unions in the Anti-Corruption Campaign
3. Cooperation with the Media in Implementing the Anti-Corruption Campaign
4. Cooperation with Religious Institutions to Foster Moral Integrity and Counteract Corruption

Fifth Action Line: Changing Public Perceptions of Corruption
1. Anti-Corruption Public Awareness Campaign (Clean Future)
2. Public Education Campaign about the Rights of Citizens and Obligations of the Administration in the Sphere of Administrative Services
3. The Anti-Corruption Campaign within the System of Public Education at Its Various Levels
4. Expected Obstacles to the Achievement of the Goals of the Public Awareness Campaign

Sixth Action Line: International Cooperation
1. Cooperation with International Organizations and Integration Structures
2. International Economic, Financial, and Trade Institutions and Organizations
3. Cooperation with Other International Organizations
4. Regional Organizations and Initiatives
5. Regional Cooperation on a Multilateral and Bilateral Basis
6. Cooperation with Government Aid Institutions on a Bilateral Basis

Source: http://www.online.bg/Coalition2000/eng/aplan_full [Accessed 10 November 2003]

Figure 9.   Thematic global distribution of programme

Table 4.   Countries with anti-corruption agencies

Albania	Cambodia	Moldova	Poland	Russia
Argentina	Cameroon	Nicaragua	Romania	Slovakia
Armenia	Chad	Kazakhstan	Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan	China	Paraguay	Nigeria	Tanzania
Bangladesh	Colombia	Philippines	Kenya	Thailand
Benin	Ecuador	Ghana	Korea	Uganda
Bolivia	Ethiopia	Guatemala	Latvia	Vietnam
Bosnia	Georgia	Guinea	Malawi	Yemen
Bulgaria		India (some states)	Mali	Zambia
Burkina Faso				

publishing a wide range of journal articles and instruction manuals on fighting corruption for consumption outside of the Bank. Vigorous debate occurring in the World Bank at internal conferences and in the numerous conferences it organized was an important part of the anti-corruption selection process. Attempts to identify 'priority countries' and allocate funds to those country teams also served as an important selection mechanism.

Tracking anti-corruption project retention is both easy and difficult. Retention of anti-corruption project ideas is easy because each workshop and conference produced a set of recommendations or an action plan—thus facilitating analysis of which parts of the anti-corruption agenda were selected. Table 4 also shows which countries have retained anti-corruption project advice in the concrete form for donor support in their anti-corruption agencies. Given the wide range of countries adopting anti-corruption agencies, the retention rate of anti-corruption projects appears high.

Tracking project retention is difficult because increasing evidence suggests that 'first wave' anti-corruption activities were not useful. Haarhuis and Leeuw (2002) find that anti-corruption training was little used by participants. Michael (2003) finds that it is not simple propagation of anti-corruption programmes but the quality of those programmes which ultimately determine the value of global anti-corruption work. In the broader perspective, Kaufmann (2003) finds that 'the usefulness of anti-corruption 'campaigns', creation of new institutions or passage of laws, as well as much of the traditional public sector management and legal reform approaches, may have been over-rated'.[34]

As can be seen from the evolution of the anti-corruption industry in the 1990s, the simple project management rule—'take a prior set of knowledge combine it with local country circumstances, and then move on to the next project'—has some power to describe the self-organized complexity of the anti-corruption industry. Such a complexity view also holds lessons for the broader field of international development.

LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A complexity view of anti-corruption addresses wider issues in international development.[35] Four applied perspectives on anti-corruption programmes were previously

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[34]The Open Society Justice Initiative (1999) should make an important contribute to this evaluation once it is complete.

[35]The concept of 'development' is a highly contested term and I do not wish to go into this debate. For simplicity, the definition of 'economic development' for this essay comes from the Soubbotina (2002) as the 'qualitative change and restructuring in a country's economy in connection with technological and social progress' where the main indicator for economic development is increasing GDP per capita.

given—universalistic, state-centric, society-centric and critical. Yet, this taxonomy represents more than a categorization of anti-corruption programmes—but reflects a broader taxonomy roughly sweeping across development theory (Peet, 1999; Seligson and Passe-Smith, 1993). To the extent that observations can be made about this taxonomy for anti-corruption, such observations might be equally valid for international development.

A complexity view of anti-corruption has more affinity with recent thinking about development with the rejection of universal laws and scientific knowledge which has supposedly characterised 'developmentalism' (Scott, 1998). Developmentalism would comprise universalistic, state-centric and society centric views of planned change in anti-corruption and any other area of international development. In contrast, new perspectives of development have arisen as a critique of developmentalism, offering a variety of viewpoints and perspectives from stressing the importance of local knowledge and community based organizations to a rejection of 'neo-colonialist thought'.

At the international level, developmentalism has been based on the role of international organizations to provide capital and co-ordinate the reconstruction effort (Todaro, 2000). At the national level, state-led development had always been on the agenda and had gained prominence with the gained new ground in the study of East Asia growth experience (World Bank, 1993). If the state is involved, it requires integration or 'synergy' (Tendler, 1997; Evans, 1995). At the local level, the developmentalist paradigm relied on NGOs and 'local capacity' (World Bank, 1996; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Bebbington *et al.*, 1988). A developmentalist approach to anti-corruption would stress the role of co-ordinated planning and the superior knowledge of public 'experts'. Indeed, many of the anti-corruption efforts in the past were highly developmentalist in nature—with some succeeding and others failing. In the 'North', developmentalist anti-corruption often succeeded in the long-run whereas in the 'South' it did not. The failure of anti-corruption in the South has been the prime driver of searches for alternative methods of anti-corruption—just as the failure of 'development' in the South has been the driver for searches for alternative methods of development.[36]

Increasingly in the development literature, there is a rejection of many developmentalist tenants. At the international level, the international organisations have only contributed to the 'growth of ignorance' (Hobert, 1993) and 'depoliticisation' of a hegemonic agenda (Escobar, 1996). Instead of IFI-led development, new views look toward multi-layered governance relying on international governmental agencies, international business, civil society and local groups to influence the contours of development (Held *et al.*, 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2003). Instead of a growth-based perspective, some new views rely on 'sustainability' focusing on the human and environmental eco-system (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Merchant, 1992). At the national level, state-led development is rejected in favour of participation (Petty *et al.*, 1995). Just as the international level is multi-layered, so is the national level development, focusing on stakeholder participation, empowerment and capacity building. Finally, at the local level, organisation-led development is rejected in favour of the application of indigenous knowledge by communities (Agrawal, 1995; Long and Long, 1992). New views to anti-corruption would stress the highly participatory nature of anti-corruption while encouraging project variety. The main difference between the evolutionary perspective on anti-corruption and some of the new

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[36]If developmentalist conceptions are being rejected in the North, less stress is placed on the long-run failure of these policies. Instead, stress is placed on the changing nature of society in the North with its stress on the 'new production of knowledge' (Gibbons *et al.*, 1994).

theorising is that an evolutionary perspective stresses the role of *tâtonnement* or stumbling along to find the best organizational form.

What does complexity theory add to the debate and particularly to the new views of development? First, complexity theory recognizes the evolutionary aspect behind anti-corruption work and development work more generally. Unlike standard theorizing which divides theories into periods or types, complexity recognizes the fact that new theories of development evolved from developmentalism in the same way that 'second wave' anti-corruption efforts (stressing capacity building) grew from 'first wave' ones (stressing awareness raising). Second, complexity theory allows for theorising about how simple rules create large structures. In developmentalism, the simple (positivist) rule 'work hard to generate results which if not generated require more effort' militate for centralized, high control type organisational structures.[37] In the new views of development, the simple rule 'do something, learn and modify it in the next location' produced an entirely different and decentralized organization structure. Third, if ideas are 'agents' then a multiplicity of ideas is not simply tolerated (like in the new views of development) but actively encouraged.

Given a complexity perspective, there are a number of lessons for organizational design of a 'second wave' of anti-corruption work. Complex anti-corruption systems (organizations) should be built incrementally from simple and highly effective systems. The large-scale national action plans should be rejected for small programmes which can be expanded. Variation in such systems should also be encouraged rather than the standard action planning approaches of anti-corruption's 'first wave'. Given the need for such variation, competition between small-scale anti-corruption projects and ideas may be the better strategy in the long-run instead of the current system of 'gentleman's development' based on 'donor co-ordination' and 'harmonization'. Third, to the greatest extent possible, anti-corruption programmes should not be global in scope or perspective but should be based on local action. Global programmes—such as the UN's Convention—can set a framework, but they should remain flexible; if the Convention is too binding, it precludes adaptive responses.[38] Finally, the anti-corruption industry should not resist 'punctuated equilibrium' (or dramatic changes in direction) as these often are important evolutionary responses to changes in the environment. Instead, anti-corruption practitioners and their bosses should be amenable to radical changes in the nature of anti-corruption if it appears such work is ineffective (as it presently does)!

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[37]Such simple rules did not spontaneous arise but combined a micro-politics as they were promoted by those who gained power with a wide spread observations on the effects of science and technology.
[38]Such flexibility derives from the fact that local interactions over time lead to feedback which allows more complex systems to evolve at the local, national and international levels.

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